Abstract
Background: Executive remuneration has long been linked to company performance as a mechanism to align managerial and shareholder interests. However, crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic have raised questions about the robustness of this alignment, particularly in emerging markets where governance mechanisms are still maturing.
Aim: This study investigates how COVID-19 affected the relationship between executive pay and firm performance among companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE).
Setting: The analysis focuses on 222 JSE-listed companies spanning multiple sectors in South Africa, observed over a 10-year period from 2015 to 2024.
Method: A quantitative, non-experimental panel design was applied using secondary data. Multiple regression models tested the relationship between executive remuneration and firm performance (Return on Assets, Return on Equity and Tobin’s Q), controlling for firm size and leverage. A COVID-19 dummy variable and interaction terms assessed pandemic effects.
Results: The results indicate a weak association between executive remuneration and firm performance and show that while executive pay increased during the COVID-19 period, the sensitivity of pay to performance did not change significantly.
Conclusion: The pandemic coincided with higher executive pay but no significant change in pay-performance sensitivity, indicating persistent governance weaknesses and limited incentive alignment.
Contribution: The study provides novel empirical evidence on how executive remuneration behaves during a systemic global crisis in an emerging market context. Its originality lies in a 10-year panel spanning pre-, during- and post-pandemic periods and the use of multiple estimation strategies, contributing to debates on incentive alignment, corporate governance resilience and pay-for-performance integrity.
Keywords: executive remuneration; pay-performance sensitivity; managerial power; COVID-19 pandemic; corporate governance; South Africa; JSE-listed companies; emerging markets.
Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic severely disrupted global health systems and economies, with South Africa reporting its first confirmed case on 05 March 2020 and experiencing more than 4 million infections and 93 000 deaths by early 2022 (Bradshaw et al. 2022; Stiegler & Bouchard 2020). Although the government’s swift lockdown and testing response drew international praise (De Villiers, Cerbone & Van Zijl 2020), the restrictions and fatalities triggered widespread social and economic distress. Many industries remained non-operational, and numerous firms were forced to close their doors (Arndt et al. 2020; Muthu & Wesson 2023). The hospitality sector, for example, faced severe liquidity constraints and bankruptcies because of collapsing consumer demand and limited access to funding (Sucheran 2022).
The pandemic’s economic shock sharply reduced profitability across sectors, leaving many companies financially distressed. Empirical studies show that such distress often weakens the pay-performance relationship, as firms struggle to maintain incentive integrity under pressure (Carter, Hotchkiss & Mohseni 2020, Chang, Hayes & Hillegeist 2016). In South Africa, despite falling corporate earnings and gross domestic product (GDP) contraction (Arndt et al. 2020; Muthu & Wesson 2023), executive remuneration in some entities, for example, in state-owned enterprises, remained largely unaffected or even increased (Bezuidenhout 2021). Similar trends have been observed internationally; Ye, Chen and Kelly (2023) found that executive pay in 1280 S&P 1500 firms rose during the pandemic despite declining performance. These outcomes reinforce public concern that executive pay has become increasingly disconnected from actual performance, raising questions about fairness and the need for stronger regulation (Bebchuk 2009).
While prior studies have explored the general link between pay and performance, little is known about how this relationship behaves during periods of systemic crisis, particularly in emerging markets. Existing research has focused mainly on stable economic conditions in developed economies (Bedford et al. 2023; Eklund & Stern 2021; Mahssouni, Touijer & Makhroute 2022). The South African context remains under-explored despite its distinctive corporate landscape and the presence of advanced governance codes such as King IV, which emphasises ethical leadership, transparency and performance-linked remuneration (Scholtz, Jachi & Nel 2025).
The pandemic also exposed persistent governance challenges in aligning executive incentives with firm outcomes. Studies show that internal determinants, such as board decisions (Bussin 2015) and external factors like GDP and unemployment (Muthu & Wesson 2023), jointly contribute to company performance. Yet, even amid severe macroeconomic decline, executive pay often continued to rise (Ye et al. 2023). This misalignment suggests that the agency problem, where executives’ interests diverge from those of shareholders, may have intensified during the crisis (Jarby 2022).
Against this backdrop, and given the limited evidence from emerging markets on how pay-performance dynamics respond to systemic crisis, this study contributes to the literature by examining how executive remuneration responds to firm performance under conditions of systemic crisis within an emerging market context, thereby providing evidence on whether incentive alignment mechanisms remain effective during periods of economic disruption.
This study examines the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the relationship between executive remuneration and firm performance among Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE)-listed firms. Specifically, the study addresses the following research questions:
- RQ1: What is the relationship between executive remuneration and firm performance among JSE-listed firms over the period 2015–2024?
- RQ2: Did the COVID-19 pandemic alter the sensitivity of executive pay to firm performance?
- RQ3: Did executive remuneration increase during the pandemic independently of underlying firm performance outcomes?
In addressing these research questions, this study contributes to the literature in three key ways. Firstly, it provides empirical evidence from an emerging market context, addressing the limited evidence on pay-performance dynamics in Africa. Secondly, it extends the literature by examining how executive remuneration behaves during a systemic crisis, thereby testing whether incentive alignment mechanisms remain robust under extreme economic conditions. Thirdly, by using a longitudinal panel dataset spanning pre-, during- and post-pandemic periods from 2015 to 2024, the study provides a comprehensive assessment of whether changes in executive pay are driven by firm performance or broader structural and governance factors. These contributions provide important insights for policymakers, boards and investors seeking to design remuneration structures that remain equitable, transparent and performance-linked during periods of economic disruption.
Literature review
The study examines whether executive remuneration remained sensitive to company performance among JSE-listed firms during the COVID-19 pandemic. The literature first sets out the theoretical foundations that motivate performance-linked pay, then considers the main determinants of remuneration beyond performance. It next reviews evidence on how researchers measure performance and on how pay and performance move together in both stable times and in crisis. Finally, it situates the question in the South African governance and macroeconomic context and reflects on ethical and strategic behaviours that can distort incentives.
Theoretical perspectives and determinants of executive remuneration
Agency theory frames the incentive problem between shareholders and managers and motivates the practice of linking executive pay to observable outcomes to align interests and reduce agency costs (Durham & Bartol 2012; Jensen & Meckling 1979). In this view, contracts that weight variable remuneration against performance should direct managerial effort towards value creation. Practical frictions may weaken this logic. Executives may pursue personal utility rather than shareholder value, bear costs with limited direct benefit or prefer higher compensation for less effort, all of which reduce alignment (Copeland & Weston 1988; Jensen & Murphy 1990; O’Reilly & Main 2010). Evidence from developing markets further complicates the picture. Concentrated ownership and weak institutional enforcement limit the effectiveness of board independence and remuneration contracts and shift the conflict towards majority versus minority shareholders, which calls for stronger external oversight and auditing (Yusuf, Yousaf & Saeed 2018). During shocks such as the pandemic, firms also tend to change pay packages towards what is easiest to attain, for example, greater use of cash incentives (Carter et al. 2020; Jarby 2022).
Optimal contracting theory builds on the agency logic by emphasising contract design that balances motivation with risk sharing, and that combines fixed and variable components selected to proxy value creation (Bussin 2015). Early work links ownership and liability to agency costs and cautions that poor contract design weakens the sensitivity between pay and performance (Jensen & Meckling 1979). Later contributions argue that simple models miss real-world complexity and call for context-specific designs that link pay more tightly to performance requirements (Edmans & Gabaix 2009). Managerial power theory provides a behavioural counterpoint by arguing that executives can influence the level and structure of their own pay through ownership, structural, expert and prestige power, especially when monitoring is weak, which disconnects compensation from performance (Chen, Ezzamel & Cai 2011; Finkelstein 1992).
While agency theory and optimal contracting theory both assume that remuneration structures are designed to align executive incentives with shareholder interests, they differ in their underlying assumptions about how effectively this alignment is achieved in practice. Agency theory emphasises incentive alignment through monitoring and contract design (Jensen & Meckling 1979), whereas optimal contracting theory focuses on efficiency in balancing risk and reward through well-designed compensation structures (Bussin 2015; Edmans & Gabaix 2009). In contrast, managerial power theory challenges both perspectives by arguing that remuneration outcomes may reflect executive influence over boards rather than optimal or efficient contracting (Chen et al. 2011). This theoretical tension suggests that observed pay-performance relationships may not always reflect alignment, particularly in contexts characterised by weak governance or external shocks.
Beyond incentives, structural characteristics such as firm size, complexity and risk exposure strongly influence executive pay. Larger organisations demand greater managerial capability and thus pay higher compensation (Ciscel & Carroll 1980; Tosi et al. 2000). Managerial experience and age also affect pay levels (Bussin 2015). These determinants imply that any assessment of incentive alignment should control for firm-specific characteristics.
Performance measurement underlies the pay-performance link. Accounting-based indicators such as earnings per share, return on assets and return on equity capture internal performance but can be manipulated and may ignore risk and inflation (Bussin 2015). Market-based indicators, including stock returns and market-to-book value, better reflect investor sentiment but are sensitive to market noise (Bussin 2015). Value-based metrics such as economic value added (EVA) and market value added (MVA) incorporate the cost of capital and aim to measure true economic profit, though their advantages are context specific rather than universal (Bussin 2015; Obeidat & Darkal 2018).
Evidence on the pay-performance relationship and the South African context
Empirical studies reveal a complex and often inconsistent relationship between executive pay and firm performance. While some studies document a positive and significant association between executive pay and firm performance, consistent with agency theory predictions (Bussin 2015; Kirsten & Du Toit 2018), others report weak, insignificant or context-dependent links, particularly in South African and other emerging market settings (De Wet 2012; Duffhues & Kabir 2008). This divergence suggests that pay-performance sensitivity is highly context dependent and may weaken under conditions where managerial discretion, governance quality or external economic shocks override the incentive mechanisms embedded in remuneration contracts (Ntim et al. 2015). During periods of financial distress or macroeconomic turbulence, the correlation between pay and performance tends to weaken further, as firms under liquidity pressure often adjust compensation towards short-term incentives that prioritise cash flow management rather than long-term value creation (Carter et al. 2020). Research on distressed or restructured firms indicates that even when executives experience pay cuts or bonus reductions, total wealth losses remain modest compared to declines in company performance (Gilson & Vetsuypens 1993).
International evidence supports this trend. Jarby (2022) found that Swedish executives were effectively ‘paid for failure’ during the COVID-19 pandemic, receiving high remuneration despite poor performance outcomes. In the South African context, research indicates that while agency and optimal contracting theories explain pay dynamics during stable periods, executive remuneration is also significantly influenced by governance structures, consistent with managerial power perspectives (Ntim et al. 2015). Across global studies, variable pay demonstrates a stronger association with firm results than fixed pay, though this relationship becomes weaker during recessions (Bussin 2015; Gerhart & Milkovich 1990; Gregg, Jewell & Tonks 2010; Shaw 2011).
Corporate governance frameworks provide the institutional boundaries within which remuneration policies operate. Governance encompasses the systems, principles and processes that define how boards, executives and shareholders interact to achieve accountability and transparency (Dalton et al. 2007; Gutterman 2020). In South Africa, the evolution from the King III to King IV Code introduced stricter disclosure and fairness requirements, including the obligation to report on performance criteria, targets and outcomes, as well as to ensure pay equity within firms (Scholtz et al. 2025). These measures aim to enhance trust between firms and their stakeholders and align remuneration with sustainable performance. External governance mechanisms, such as those enforced by the JSE, further reinforce accountability (Aras & Crowther 2016; Rehman et al. 2021).
The COVID-19 pandemic had severe macroeconomic shocks on South Africa, marked by declines in output, employment and revenue across sectors (De Villiers et al. 2020). While JSE-listed firms experienced revenue and market value contractions, the magnitude of the impact varied by industry. Technology, telecommunications and healthcare demonstrated resilience, while real estate and basic materials recorded steep declines (Akinola, Anderu & Mbonigaba 2021; Mamaro & Mabandla 2022; Muthu & Wesson 2023; Tawiah & Keefe 2024). These uneven effects raise questions about whether executive remuneration accurately reflected firm-level performance during the crisis or whether embedded managerial influence shielded pay outcomes.
Ethical considerations further shape this debate. Studies highlight that robust corporate ethics enhance employee commitment, stakeholder trust and long-term performance (Chun et al. 2013). However, weak ethical cultures can promote opportunistic behaviour, such as manipulating financial outcomes to justify bonuses or severance packages. During the pandemic, cost-cutting measures such as retrenchments protected corporate liquidity but worsened unemployment and inequality (Arndt et al. 2020). To counteract short-termism, an increasing number of firms have linked executive pay to environmental, social and governance indicators, promoting sustainable performance and stakeholder accountability (Matemane, Moloi & Adelowotan 2022).
Overall, the literature indicates that although pay-performance alignment is a central objective of corporate governance, it remains unstable across contexts and particularly vulnerable to economic shocks and institutional weaknesses (Bussin 2015; Gregg et al. 2010). In the South African context, the COVID-19 pandemic amplified these challenges, raising concerns about whether executive remuneration continued to reflect underlying firm performance. Despite extensive research, there is limited consensus on the strength and consistency of the pay-performance relationship, particularly within emerging market contexts where governance structures influence remuneration outcomes (Ntim et al. 2015). This gap suggests that existing theoretical frameworks may not fully explain remuneration dynamics under conditions of heightened uncertainty. Accordingly, this study empirically examines whether the COVID-19 pandemic altered the pay-performance relationship among JSE-listed firms, providing evidence from an emerging market context where governance structures and external shocks intersect.
Methods
The aim of the study was to investigate the relationship between executive remuneration and company performance during the COVID-19 pandemic and to assess whether the sensitivity of pay to performance changed under conditions of economic disruption. Agency theory proposes that remuneration contracts should align managers’ incentives with shareholders’ interests through performance-linked compensation (Jensen & Meckling 1979). The COVID-19 shock generated abrupt and largely exogenous changes in profitability and market valuation (Ye et al. 2023), providing an appropriate context to test whether the traditional pay-performance alignment persisted. A quantitative and deductive research strategy was implemented to analyse the relationship between total directors’ emoluments and firm performance using a non-experimental longitudinal panel ex post facto correlational design. The ex post facto nature of the design means that remuneration and performance outcomes are historical and cannot be manipulated by the researcher. The longitudinal panel structure allows the analysis to track pay-performance sensitivity over time and to compare years within the same empirical framework.
Setting, data collection and sampling strategy
The focus area of the study was companies listed on the JSE, South Africa. The JSE setting was used because listed firms are required to disclose audited, standardised financial statements and remuneration information, allowing comparable measurement of executive pay and performance across firms and sectors (Kirsten & Du Toit 2018). Firms from all JSE sectors were included to capture remuneration dynamics across cyclical and non-cyclical industries and across firms of varying size and complexity, which are established determinants of executive remuneration (Ciscel & Carroll 1980; Duffhues & Kabir 2008).
Company financial and market data were obtained from the IRESS database. Executive remuneration values were gathered from total directors’ emoluments disclosed in audited annual financial statements and reconciled with IRESS data where available to ensure completeness and accuracy (Kirsten & Du Toit 2018; Muthu & Wesson 2023). The study’s population comprised all firms listed on the JSE main board between 2015 and 2024, totalling 234 companies. A purposive census-style sampling approach was applied by retaining all firms subject to data availability across the period. Firm-year observations were included when directors’ emoluments and the accounting and market variables required to compute the study measures were available for that year. Observations were excluded where remuneration disclosures were missing or where key financial or market variables were incomplete. Firms were removed only when missing data were extensive across the period. After applying these criteria, 12 firms were excluded as a result of insufficient data, leaving 222 firms. The final dataset contains 2010 firm-year observations in an unbalanced panel because some firms do not have data for every year.
The study time frame covers 10 financial years and was divided into three phases: A pre-pandemic period 2015 to 2019, the pandemic period 2020 to 2021 and a post-pandemic recovery period 2022 to 2024. This periodisation allows direct comparison of pay-performance sensitivity under normal conditions and during the COVID-19 shock, consistent with pandemic-era pay-performance studies that isolate COVID effects through period dummies and interactions (Jarby 2022; Tusiime 2024). Monetary values were recorded in South African rands. Where firms reported in foreign currencies, values were converted into rands using average annual exchange rates for balance-sheet items and year-end exchange rates for income-statement items to ensure comparability across firms and years (Shaw 2011).
Variables and measurement
Executive remuneration is the dependent variable. Executive pay (ExecPay) was measured as total directors’ emoluments disclosed in firms’ annual financial statements. This measure captures fixed salary, bonuses, benefits and other disclosed pay components, providing a comprehensive proxy for executive compensation (Kirsten & Du Toit 2018). Executive pay was transformed using the natural logarithm to normalise the distribution and reduce the influence of extreme observations, consistent with remuneration modelling practice (Cieślak 2018; Gao & Li 2015; Jarby 2022; Tusiime 2024).
Company performance was measured using both accounting-based and market-based indicators. Accounting performance was captured by return on assets (ROA), defined as net income divided by total assets, and return on equity (ROE), defined as net income divided by shareholders’ equity. Return on assets reflects overall profitability and is widely used in pay-performance research, while ROE reflects profitability relative to shareholder capital (Obeidat & Darkal 2018; Shaw 2011). Market performance was captured by Tobin’s Q (TQ), which was computed using the IRESS market capitalisation and book value of assets as a proxy for replacement cost, reflecting investor valuation and growth expectations (Fu, Singhal & Parkash 2016). Using multiple performance measures is appropriate because no single indicator captures all dimensions of firm performance relevant to executive compensation (Bussin 2015).
Two control variables were included to account for firm characteristics that influence remuneration. Firm size (FSize) was proxied by the natural logarithm of total assets, capturing organisational scale and complexity, which are associated with higher executive pay (Ciscel & Carroll 1980). Firm leverage (FLev) was defined as total liabilities divided by total assets, capturing financial risk and capital-structure constraints relevant to remuneration policy (Duffhues & Kabir 2008; Tusiime 2024).
To isolate the COVID-19 shock, a binary indicator (COVIDDummy) was coded 1 for the pandemic years 2020–2021 and 0 for all other years. Interaction terms were constructed between the COVIDDummy, and each performance measure to test whether pay-performance sensitivity differed during the pandemic relative to the surrounding periods (Jarby 2022). Definitions and operationalisation of all variables are summarised in Table 1.
| TABLE 1: Variable definition and measurement. |
While multiple performance measures are used to capture different dimensions of firm outcomes, each proxy is subject to inherent limitations. Accounting-based measures such as ROA and ROE are derived from financial statement data and primarily reflect historical aspects of firm performance, which may limit their ability to capture future growth expectations and market perceptions (Obeidat & Darkal 2018). In contrast, market-based measures such as Tobin’s Q, obtained from the IRESS database, are sensitive to market volatility and investor sentiment, particularly during periods of economic disruption such as the COVID-19 pandemic (Bussin 2015). Consequently, Tobin’s Q may capture broader market conditions and forward-looking investor expectations rather than purely firm-specific performance (Fu et al. 2016). To address these limitations, the study employs both accounting- and market-based indicators, consistent with prior literature (Kirsten & Du Toit 2018; Nkwadi & Matemane 2022), to provide a more comprehensive and balanced assessment of firm performance and its relationship with executive remuneration (Bussin 2015).
Data preparation and analyses
All data were compiled into a firm-year panel and screened for missing observations and consistency before estimation. Continuous variables were winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles prior to log transformation to reduce the influence of extreme outliers in line with previous pay-performance studies (Jarby 2022). The analysis began with descriptive statistics to summarise the distributions of remuneration, performance and control variables, followed by a Pearson correlation matrix to examine preliminary associations among variables.
Ordinary least squares (OLS) panel regression with year and industry fixed-effects is adopted as the primary estimation technique because it provides transparent and interpretable baseline estimates of pay-performance sensitivity across the full panel, consistent with prior executive compensation studies (Bussin 2015, Gerhart & Milkovich 1990). This approach is appropriate given the study’s focus on estimating average relationships across a large panel while controlling for observable time and industry effects. However, OLS may not fully account for unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity and potential endogeneity arising from the simultaneous determination of executive pay and firm performance, as remuneration and performance may be jointly determined (Ntim et al. 2015). Accordingly, firm fixed-effects and dynamic generalised method of moments estimations are subsequently employed as robustness checks to control for unobserved heterogeneity, reverse causality and persistence in remuneration dynamics (Arellano & Bond 1991).
Pay-performance sensitivity was examined using panel OLS regression incorporating year and industry fixed-effects, which control for economy-wide shocks and structural sectoral differences in remuneration practices, respectively. The moderating role of the COVID-19 period was tested by introducing a binary pandemic indicator and its interactions with each performance measure into the same regression framework.
Baseline pay-performance sensitivity is estimated as follows (Equation 1):
where i indexes firms, t indexes years, γt are year fixed-effects and δS are industry fixed-effects.
To test whether pay-performance sensitivity differed during the COVID-19 period, the baseline model is extended to include the pandemic dummy variable and interaction terms:
COVID-19 interaction model (Equation 2):
Robustness checks were conducted in two steps. Initially, a firm fixed-effects model was estimated to account for unobserved time-invariant firm heterogeneity that could affect remuneration, while still controlling for year effects. A dynamic panel generalised method of moments estimator, specifically the difference generalised method of moments (GMM) approach following Arellano and Bond (1991), was employed to address potential endogeneity, simultaneity and persistence in executive pay and performance. Lagged instruments from t-2 onward were used to reduce reverse causality and limit instrument proliferation. Model validity was assessed using the Arellano-Bond AR(1) and AR(2) tests for serial correlation, together with the Sargan and Hansen tests of over-identifying restrictions to confirm instrument validity and overall specification consistency (Arellano & Bond 1991).
Ethical considerations
Ethical clearance to conduct this study was obtained from the University of Pretoria Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences Research Ethics Committee, University of Pretoria (No. EMS146/25). All variables were derived from publicly available audited secondary sources (IRESS and company annual reports), and no human participants were involved. Consequently, issues of informed consent, confidentiality and anonymity did not arise. The results of the empirical analyses are presented and discussed in the next section.
Results
The data were analysed to evaluate the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance among JSE-listed companies over the period 2015–2024. The analysis included 2010 firm-year observations drawn from 222 companies across 10 industries. Outliers were winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles to minimise distortion.
Descriptive analysis
The descriptive results (Table 2) provide an overview of directors’ emoluments and firm-level characteristics. Director emoluments ranged widely, from approximately R1.9 million to R367 million, reflecting differences in company size and sector. The mean total emolument was R49.1 million, higher than the median value of R28.3 million, suggesting a right-skewed distribution. Firms financed nearly half their assets through debt, and leverage rose slightly during the pandemic years.
Average ROA and ROE were positive at 6.9% and 8.7%, respectively, although both measures displayed large variability. Tobin’s Q averaged 1.13, indicating modest growth expectations. A comparison of non-COVID and COVID means revealed that average directors’ emoluments increased slightly during the pandemic, while all three performance measures declined marginally. The results show that executive remuneration did not move in line with performance across the two periods, indicating a potential disconnect between pay and outcomes during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Correlation analysis
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients and VIF values for the study variables. All coefficients fall well below the multicollinearity threshold of 0.8, indicating that the independent variables are suitable for regression analysis (Gujarati & Porter 2009). In addition, variance inflation factor values are well below the threshold of 10 used to diagnose multicollinearity, indicating that collinearity is unlikely to materially affect the estimation of the regression coefficients (Gujarati & Porter 2009). The strongest bivariate association is observed between directors’ emoluments and firm size (r = 0.70), suggesting that larger firms tend to pay higher executive remuneration irrespective of profitability.
| TABLE 3: Correlation matrix and variance inflation factors. |
Regression analysis
The regression results in Table 4 present five model specifications examining the determinants of directors’ emoluments. Model 1 provides the baseline pay-performance regression, while Models 2 to 4 include the COVID-19 dummy and its interaction with the three performance measures (ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q). Model 5 is the full specification, incorporating all variables and controlling for firm size, leverage and fixed-effects for industry and year.
| TABLE 4: Regression results for directors’ emoluments and firm performance (baseline and COVID-19 interaction models). |
The models show stable explanatory power, with R-squared values of about 0.59 and F-statistics significant at the 1% level. The coefficients are consistent in sign and magnitude across models, confirming robustness in the relationships identified.
Among the performance measures, Tobin’s Q shows the strongest positive and significant association with directors’ emoluments. In the full model, a one-unit increase in Tobin’s Q is associated with an estimated 3.1% increase in compensation. This result suggests that boards reward executives in firms with stronger market valuations and higher future growth expectations. Return on assets is also positive and significant, but with a smaller magnitude, indicating that firms with better asset efficiency tend to pay slightly higher remuneration. The stability of this coefficient across specifications implies that operational performance remains a modest but reliable driver of pay. Return on equity is insignificant across all models, indicating that shareholder-based profitability does not play a central role in determining executive pay.
The coefficient on the COVID-19 dummy is positive and significant at the 1% level, showing that directors’ pay was higher during the pandemic years after controlling for performance and firm characteristics. The magnitude of this increase, about 11%, implies that firms may have provided additional incentives to retain or compensate executives under heightened uncertainty. However, the interaction terms between COVID-19 and the three performance indicators are insignificant, suggesting that the relationship between pay and performance did not materially change during the pandemic. Pay levels increased, but sensitivity to performance remained weak.
Among the control variables, firm size has the most pronounced effect on directors’ emoluments. A 10% increase in firm size corresponds to an estimated 3.7% increase in pay, highlighting that larger, more complex firms tend to reward executives more generously. Leverage is also positive and significant, indicating that directors in more highly geared firms receive higher compensation, possibly as a premium for managing financial risk.
Overall, the regression analysis shows a weak but positive link between executive pay and firm performance. Market-based and accounting-based measures have limited explanatory power, while structural characteristics such as firm size and leverage are stronger predictors. Although executive pay rose during the COVID-19 period, this increase was not accompanied by greater sensitivity to performance, pointing to persistent misalignment between remuneration and firm outcomes.
Robustness analysis
All models control for industry and year fixed-effects. Dependent variable: Natural logarithm of directors’ emoluments.
Results confirm that firm size remains the most consistent determinant of directors’ pay across all panels. Pay-performance sensitivity is weak across industries and time periods, with marginal strengthening in high-performing firms and weakening during the COVID-19 period.
The dependent variable is ln(directors’ emoluments). The fixed-effects model controls for unobserved, time-invariant firm heterogeneity. The dynamic panel GMM model addresses potential endogeneity and persistence by instrumenting explanatory variables with their lagged values, including the lagged dependent variable.
Diagnostic tests for the GMM specification are as follows: Arellano-Bond AR(1): z = −3.50 (p = 0.000); AR(2): z = 2.10 (p = 0.036). Sargan χ2 = 33.46 (p = 0.03); Hansen χ2 = 24.59 (p = 0.22). While the AR(1) result is as expected, the significant AR(2) statistic indicates potential second-order serial correlation and raises concerns regarding instrument validity. The Hansen test fails to reject the null of valid instruments, whereas the Sargan test rejects it, suggesting mixed evidence. The GMM results are therefore presented alongside the fixed-effects estimates as a complementary specification.
To assess the stability and reliability of the baseline findings, a series of robustness checks was conducted using alternative sample partitions and estimation techniques. These tests address potential concerns related to industry heterogeneity, period-specific effects, performance-level asymmetries, unobserved firm characteristics and endogeneity in the pay-performance relationship.
Subsample and cross-sectional robustness tests
Firstly, the baseline model was re-estimated across industry subsamples, time periods and performance-based firm groupings, as reported in Table 5. Industry-level regressions address the possibility that pay-performance sensitivity varies systematically across sectors because of differences in governance structures, capital intensity and market cyclicality, for example. Consistent with prior governance studies, firm size remains the most stable and economically significant determinant of executive remuneration across all industries (Matovic 2021; Nkwadi & Matemane 2022), while performance measures exhibit weak and heterogeneous effects. Importantly, the COVID-19 dummy remains positive and significant in several sectors, indicating that elevated executive pay during the pandemic was not confined to a specific industry but reflected a broader market phenomenon.
| TABLE 5: Robustness summary – Industry, period and performance-level analysis. |
Secondly, period-based regressions examine whether the pay-performance relationship differed across the pre-pandemic, pandemic and post-pandemic periods. This test addresses concerns that pooled estimates may mask structural breaks associated with the COVID-19 shock. The results show that while accounting- and market-based performance measures retain some explanatory power before and after the pandemic, their influence weakens during the COVID-19 period. This pattern supports the central finding that pay-performance sensitivity deteriorated under conditions of economic disruption, consistent with evidence from pandemic-era remuneration studies.
Thirdly, performance-level subsample analyses distinguish between high- and low-performing firms to account for potential non-linearities in remuneration contracts. This test addresses the concern that average effects may obscure differential incentive structures across firm types. The results indicate marginally stronger pay-performance sensitivity among high-performing firms, while low-performing firms exhibit weaker and less consistent links between remuneration and performance. However, the COVID interaction remains insignificant in both groups, reinforcing the conclusion that pandemic-era pay increases were not performance contingent.
Firm fixed-effects and dynamic panel estimation
Initially, a firm fixed-effects model was estimated to account for unobserved, time-invariant firm heterogeneity, including latent characteristics such as governance quality, corporate culture and ownership structure while still controlling for year effects. Subsequently, a dynamic panel generalised method of moments estimator, specifically the difference GMM approach following Arellano and Bond (1991), was employed to address potential endogeneity, simultaneity and persistence in executive pay and performance. By instrumenting explanatory variables with their lagged values, this approach mitigates reverse causality between pay and performance. The lagged dependent variable is positive and highly significant, confirming strong persistence in executive pay setting practices. Diagnostic tests, including the Arellano-Bond serial correlation tests and the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions, provide broadly supportive evidence regarding instrument validity and overall model specification. The GMM estimates should therefore be interpreted alongside the fixed-effects results, offering complementary insights while accounting for potential endogeneity concerns (Arellano & Bond 1991), as reported in Table 6.
| TABLE 6: Firm fixed-effects and dynamic panel generalised method of moments results. |
Across all robustness checks, the direction and magnitude of the key results remain largely unchanged. Executive remuneration exhibits a weak association with firm performance, while the COVID-19 period coincides with higher pay levels that are not consistently related to performance outcomes. The interaction terms between performance measures and the COVID-19 indicator are generally insignificant, suggesting that the pandemic did not materially alter the sensitivity of executive pay to firm performance. Overall, these findings indicate that pay-performance alignment remained weak during the pandemic.
Discussion
The results of this study reveal a weak but positive relationship between directors’ emoluments and firm performance, measured by Tobin’s Q and return on assets. The coefficients are statistically significant but economically small, suggesting that while profitability and market value influence remuneration, they are not the dominant determinants of executive pay among JSE-listed firms. These findings align with prior South African evidence that pay-performance sensitivity measures via traditional financial and market metrics is weak or inconsistent across sectors (De Wet 2012; Matemane et al. 2023; Ngwenya & Khumalo 2012) and confirm earlier international studies that document limited incentive alignment in the presence of managerial discretion (Bebchuk 2009). Return on equity was found to be insignificant, echoing research showing that shareholder returns, while central in theory, rarely serve as reliable drivers of pay in practice (Aduda 2011, Carlson & Bussin 2020).
From a theoretical standpoint, the findings strongly support Managerial Power Theory, which argues that executives possess the influence and authority to shape their own compensation packages (Bebchuk 2009). Within this framework, weak pay-performance sensitivity is not a market failure but a governance outcome. Executives, by virtue of their structural and informational advantages, can influence board decisions in ways that preserve favourable pay levels even when performance weakens. The findings also resonate with studies suggesting that remuneration contracts may be used strategically to sustain leadership stability, prestige and control rather than to maximise shareholder value (Jarby 2022). These findings extend the theoretical literature by suggesting that, within a crisis context, the predictive power of agency theory and optimal contracting theory, both of which assume that incentive alignment is maintained through contract design, may be weakened. In contrast, managerial power theory, with its emphasis on executive influence over governance processes, appears to provide a more plausible explanation for the observed remuneration dynamic (Bebchuk 2009; Pepper 2021).
The results further show that directors’ emoluments increased significantly during the COVID-19 pandemic, independent of firm performance. The positive coefficient on the COVID-19 dummy variable and the insignificance of the interaction terms with performance measures suggest that executive pay rose in absolute terms but did not become more performance sensitive. This pattern indicates that the pandemic triggered a pay-level effect rather than a structural shift in incentive mechanisms. These findings are consistent with those of Shaw (2011), who observed that crises often weaken pay-performance alignment as firms prioritise leadership retention. They also parallel the findings of Jarby (2022), who reported that in Swedish firms, executive pay increased during the pandemic without a corresponding improvement in sensitivity to performance. Such patterns reinforce the interpretation that crises strengthen managerial bargaining power, allowing executives to secure higher pay justified as risk premiums or continuity rewards (Aldogan Eklund 2022).
The robustness analyses offer deeper insights into the structure of remuneration and its responsiveness across contexts. Across industries, firm size emerged as the most consistent determinant of directors’ emoluments, confirming earlier findings that larger firms pay more because of both operational complexity and executive influence (Ciscel & Carroll 1980; Nkwadi & Matemane 2022). However, the dominance of firm size over performance variables suggests that structural characteristics, rather than results, anchor executive pay decisions. Sectoral differences were evident: Profitability, proxied by ROA, was significant in Basic Materials and Consumer Discretionary industries, while Tobin’s Q carried greater weight in Industrials and Real Estate. This variation implies that industry context shapes the emphasis on accounting versus market-based metrics, reflecting discretionary adaptation rather than a unified performance standard.
The period-based robustness analysis provided further evidence of cyclical fragility in incentive mechanisms. The pay-performance relationship weakened during the pandemic years but reappeared afterwards, confirming that performance-based remuneration is most effective in stable conditions. Fixed-effects models confirmed that the relationship between pay and performance persisted even after controlling for unobserved firm-specific factors, strengthening the internal validity of the results. The dynamic GMM estimation revealed that lagged pay was strongly significant, suggesting that remuneration decisions are path-dependent and exhibit inertia over time. Such persistence supports the notion of remuneration ratcheting, where executive pay levels are adjusted upwards in good times but rarely corrected downwards when conditions worsen (Gschwandtner & Hirsch 2018). This pattern reflects the entrenchment predicted by Managerial Power Theory and points to institutional rigidity within remuneration practices.
Taken together, the results demonstrate that executive remuneration in South Africa is shaped more by firm size, governance discretion and historical pay norms than by real economic performance. The weak responsiveness of pay to profitability and market valuation suggests that remuneration committees may not be fully enforcing the principle of ‘pay for performance’. Instead, pay structures appear to reward positional authority and firm scale more than actual outcomes, a pattern consistent with the agency problem and the prevalence of rent extraction in executive pay (Bebchuk 2009).
The policy and governance implications are significant. Boards and remuneration committees should enhance transparency by explicitly disclosing how executive pay responds to firm performance. Disclosure should include both the level of remuneration and its elasticity relative to key financial and non-financial performance indicators. In line with King IV’s principle of ethical and effective leadership, remuneration frameworks should integrate longer-term, risk-adjusted measures such as economic value added and equity-based performance targets. There is also scope for including Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) indicators to ensure that pay practices reinforce sustainable value creation (Matemane et al. 2023). Regulators could strengthen remuneration disclosure standards by requiring firms to explain deviations between pay outcomes and performance, while investors should use their voting power to hold boards accountable when such deviations occur.
This study has limitations that warrant consideration. The sample includes only publicly listed firms and therefore does not capture remuneration patterns within private- or state-owned enterprises, where governance mechanisms may differ. The study also aggregates directors’ emoluments, preventing distinctions between fixed, short-term and long-term pay components. Future research could disaggregate these categories to assess how each element responds to changes in firm performance and governance conditions. Additional governance variables, such as board independence, ownership concentration, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) tenure and the composition of remuneration committees, should also be considered to capture the micro-dynamics of pay setting.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this study provides robust evidence that the pay-performance relationship among JSE-listed firms remains weak and largely dominated by firm characteristics rather than firm outcomes. The COVID-19 pandemic intensified this pattern by raising executive pay levels without enhancing pay-performance sensitivity. The persistence of these findings across robustness tests, fixed-effects estimation and dynamic GMM analysis underscores the institutional stability of executive remuneration practices in South Africa. These results reaffirm the relevance of managerial power as a theoretical explanation for weak incentive alignment and highlight the need for governance reforms that focus not only on remuneration levels but also on responsiveness and fairness. By improving transparency, broadening performance metrics and reinforcing board independence, South African firms can move toward a more accountable and performance-driven remuneration culture that supports equitable corporate leadership and long-term economic sustainability.
Acknowledgement
This article is partially based on Armando P. Lionjanga’s master’s dissertation titled ‘The COVID-19 pandemic and the pay-performance nexus among JSE-listed companies’ towards the degree of Master of Commerce in Financial Management Sciences in the Department of Financial Management, Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences, University of Pretoria, South Africa, in 2025. The dissertation was supervised by Prof. Reon Matemane. The dissertation is currently unpublished and is not available online. The dissertation was reworked, revised, and adapted into a journal article for publication.
Competing interest
The authors declare that they have no financial or personal relationships that may have inappropriately influenced them in writing this article.
CRediT authorship contribution
Armando P. Lionjanga: Data curation, Formal analysis, Investigation, Methodology, Project administration, Resources, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing. Reon Matemane: Conceptualisation, Methodology, Project administration, Supervision, Validation, Writing – review & editing. Both authors reviewed the article, contributed to the discussion of results, approved the final version for submission and publication and take responsibility for the integrity of its findings.
Funding information
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.
Data availability
Data were collected from the IRESS database and companies’ own integrated reports, and it is available from the corresponding author, Armando P. Lionjanga, on reasonable request.
Disclaimer
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and are the product of professional research. They do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any affiliated institution, funder, agency, or that of the publisher. The authors are responsible for this article’s results, findings, and content.
References
Aduda, J., 2011, ‘The relationship between executive compensation and firm performance in the Kenyan banking sector’, Journal of Accounting and Taxation 3(6), 130–139.
Akinola, G.W., Anderu, K.S. & Mbonigaba, J., 2021, ‘The effect of a new wave of COVID-19 on the stock market performance: Evidence from the twenty JSE listed companies in South Africa’, Investment Management and Financial Innovations 18(4), 67–79. https://doi.org/10.21511/imfi.18(4).2021.07
Akinwande, M.O., Dikko, H.G. & Samson, A., 2015, ‘Variance inflation factor: As a condition for the inclusion of suppressor variable(s) in regression analysis’, Open Journal of Statistics 5(7), 754–767. https://doi.org/10.4236/ojs.2015.57075
Aldogan Eklund, M., 2022, ‘Does risk matter for executive compensation?’, Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society 22(1), 159–172. https://doi.org/10.1108/CG-12-2020-0536
Aras, G. & Crowther, D., 2016, ‘Corporate social responsibility: A broader view of corporate governance’, in G. Aras & D. Crowther (eds.), A handbook of corporate governance and social responsibility, pp. 265–280, Routledge, New York, NY.
Arellano, M. & Bond, S., 1991, ‘Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations’, Review of Economic Studies 58(2), 277–297. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297968
Arndt, C., Davies, R., Gabriel, S., Harris, L., Makrelov, K., Modise, B., Robinson, S., Simbanegavi, W., Van Seventer, D. & Anderson, L., 2020, Impact of COVID-19 on the South African economy: An initial analysis, SA-TIED Working Paper No. 111, Southern Africa – Towards Inclusive Economic Development (SA-TIED), Pretoria, South Africa, pp. 1–37.
Bebchuk, L., 2009, ‘Executive compensation and the financial crisis’, paper presented at the Harvard University Transatlantic Corporate Governance Conference, Washington, DC, September 2009.
Bedford, A., Bugeja, M., Ghannam, S., Jeganathan, D. & Ma, N., 2023, ‘Were CEO pay cuts during the COVID-19 pandemic merely symbolic? Shareholders’ reaction and outrage’, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 79, 101993. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2023.101993
Bezuidenhout, M., 2021, ‘The effect of the economic crisis on pay-performance link in South African state-owned enterprises’, South African Journal of Business Management 52(1), a1747. https://doi.org/10.4102/sajbm.v52i1.1747
Bradshaw, D., Dorrington, R., Laubscher, R., Groenewald, P. & Moultrie, T., 2022, ‘COVID-19 and all-cause mortality in South Africa – The hidden deaths in the first four waves’, South African Journal of Science 118(5–6), 1–7. https://doi.org/10.17159/sajs.2022/13300
Bussin, M., 2015, ‘CEO pay-performance sensitivity in the South African context’, South African Journal of Economic and Management Sciences 18(3), 232–244. https://doi.org/10.17159/2222-3436/2015/v18n2a7
Carlson, C. & Bussin, M.H.R., 2020, ‘Relationship between executive pay and company financial performance in South African state-owned entities’, SA Journal of Human Resource Management 18, a1211. https://doi.org/10.4102/sajhrm.v18i0.1211
Carter, M.E., Hotchkiss, E.S. & Mohseni, M., 2020, Payday before mayday: CEO compensation contracting for distressed firms, SSRN Working Paper, viewed 05 January 2026, from https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3211591
Chang, W.-J., Hayes, R.M. & Hillegeist, S.A., 2016, ‘Financial distress risk and new CEO compensation’, Management Science 62(2), 479–501. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2146
Chen, J., Ezzamel, M. & Cai, Z., 2011, ‘Managerial power theory, tournament theory, and executive pay in China’, Journal of Corporate Finance 17(4), 1176–1199. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.04.008
Chun, J.S., Shin, Y., Choi, J.N. & Kim, M.S., 2013, ‘How does corporate ethics contribute to firm financial performance? The mediating role of collective organizational commitment and organizational citizenship behavior’, Journal of Management 39(4), 853–877. https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206311419662
Cieślak, K., 2018, ‘Agency conflicts, executive compensation regulations and CEO pay-performance sensitivity: Evidence from Sweden’, Journal of Management and Governance 22, 535–563. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-018-9410-3
Ciscel, D.H. & Carroll, T.M., 1980, ‘The determinants of executive salaries: An econometric survey’, Review of Economics and Statistics 62(1), 7–13. https://doi.org/10.2307/1924267
Copeland, T.E. & Weston, J.F., 1988, Financial theory and corporate policy, Addison Wesley Publishing Company, New York, NY.
Dalton, D.R., Hitt, M.A., Certo, S.T. & Dalton, C.M., 2007, ‘The fundamental agency problem and its mitigation’, Academy of Management Annals 1(1), 1–64. https://doi.org/10.5465/078559806
De Villiers, C., Cerbone, D. & Van Zijl, W., 2020, ‘The South African government’s response to COVID-19’, Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management 32(5), 797–811. https://doi.org/10.1108/JPBAFM-07-2020-0120
De Wet, J.V., 2012, ‘Executive compensation and the EVA and MVA performance of South African listed companies’, Southern African Business Review 16(3), 57–80. https://doi.org/10520/EJC129105
Duffhues, P. & Kabir, R., 2008, ‘Is the pay–performance relationship always positive?: Evidence from the Netherlands’, Journal of Multinational Financial Management 18(1), 45–60. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mulfin.2007.02.004
Durham, C.C. & Bartol, K.M., 2012, ‘Pay for performance’, in E.A. Locke (ed.), Handbook of principles of organizational behavior, John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, NJ.
Edmans, A. & Gabaix, X., 2009, ‘Is CEO pay really inefficient? A survey of new optimal contracting theories’, European Financial Management 15(3), 486–496. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-036X.2009.00500.x
Eklund, M.A. & Stern, H.J., 2021, ‘How COVID-19 reshapes businesses and executive pay for sustainability’, Corporate Governance and Sustainability Review 5(1), 107–119. https://doi.org/10.22495/cgsrv5i1sip2
Finkelstein, S., 1992, ‘Power in top management teams: Dimensions, measurement, and validation’, Academy of Management Journal 35(3), 505–538. https://doi.org/10.5465/256485
Fu, L., Singhal, R. & Parkash, M., 2016, ‘Tobin’s q ratio and firm performance’, International Research Journal of Applied Finance 7(4), 1–10. https://doi.org/10.0704/article-2
Gao, H. & Li, K., 2015, ‘A comparison of CEO pay–performance sensitivity in privately-held and public firms’, Journal of Corporate Finance 35, 370–388. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.10.005
Gerhart, B. & Milkovich, G.T., 1990, ‘Organizational differences in managerial compensation and financial performance’, Academy of Management Journal 33(4), 663–691. https://doi.org/10.5465/256286
Gilson, S.C. & Vetsuypens, M.R., 1993, ‘CEO compensation in financially distressed firms: An empirical analysis’, Journal of Finance 48(2), 425–458. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04722.x
Gregg, P., Jewell, S. & Tonks, I., 2010, Executive pay and performance in the UK, AXA Working Paper Series, University of Bath.
Gschwandtner, A. & Hirsch, S., 2018, ‘What drives firm profitability? A comparison of the US and EU food processing industry’, Manchester School 86(3), 390–416. https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.12201
Gujarati, D.N. & Porter, D.C., 2009, Basic econometrics, McGraw-Hill, New York, NY.
Gutterman, A.S., 2020, Corporate governance and sustainability, Routledge, New York, NY.
Jarby, M., 2022, ‘Pay-performance sensitivity during the Covid-19 pandemic: Evidence from Sweden’, Master’s Programme in Accounting and Financial Management Independent thesis Advanced level, Uppsala University.
Jensen, M.C. & Meckling, W.H., 1979, ‘Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure’, in K. Brunner (ed.), Economic social institutions: Insights from the conferences on analysis and ideology, pp. 163–231, Springer Netherlands, Dordrecht.
Jensen, M.C. & Murphy, K.J., 1990, ‘Performance pay and top-management incentives’, Journal of Political Economy 98(2), 225–264. https://doi.org/10.1086/261677
Kirsten, E. & Du Toit, E., 2018, ‘The relationship between remuneration and financial performance for companies listed on the Johannesburg stock exchange’, South African Journal of Economic and Management Sciences 21(1), a2004. https://doi.org/10.4102/sajems.v21i1.2004
Mahssouni, R., Touijer, M.N. & Makhroute, M., 2022, ‘Employee compensation, training and financial performance during the COVID-19 pandemic’, Journal of Risk and Financial Management 15(12), 559. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm15120559
Mamaro, L.P. & Mabandla, N.Z., 2022, ‘The influence of the COVID-19 pandemic on the financial performance of listed retail firms in South Africa’, Acta Economica 20(37), 211–228. https://doi.org/10.7251/ACE2237211P
Matemane, R., Moloi, T. & Adelowotan, M., 2022, ‘ESG performance measures for executive pay: Delphi inquiry strategy and experts’ opinion’, Acta Commercii 22(1), a1072. https://doi.org/10.4102/ac.v22i1.1072
Matemane, R., Moloi, T., Adelowotan, M. & Biswas, P.K., 2023, ‘The use of non-financial performance metrics in determining directors’ remuneration: The case of listed companies in South Africa’, African Journal of Business Ethics 17(1), 22–44. https://doi.org/10.15249/17-1-301
Matovic, I.M., 2021, ‘Adaptation of executive compensation in COVID-19 crisis conditions’, in A. Kelemen-Erdos, P. Feher-Polgar & A. Popovics (eds.), FIKUSZ 2021 proceedings, Óbuda University, Keleti Károly Faculty of Business and Management, Budapest, 26 November 2021, pp. 28–36.
Muthu, K. & Wesson, N., 2023, ‘The impact of COVID-19 on company performance per industry sector: Evidence from South Africa’, Journal of Economic and Financial Sciences 16(1), a801. https://doi.org/10.4102/jef.v16i1.801
Ngwenya, S. & Khumalo, M., 2012, ‘CEO compensation and performance of state owned enterprises in South Africa’, Corporate Ownership & Control 10(1), 97–109. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv10i1art9
Nkwadi, R. & Matemane, R., 2022, ‘Executive compensation and company performance: Pre- and post-Marikana uprising analysis’, Southern African Business Review 26(1), 11689. https://doi.org/10.25159/1998-8125/11689
Ntim, C.G., Lindop, S., Osei, K.A. & Thomas, D.A., 2015, ‘Executive compensation, corporate governance and corporate performance: A simultaneous equation approach’, Managerial and Decision Economics 36(2), 67–96. https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.2653
O’Reilly, C.A. & Main, B.G.M., 2010, ‘Economic and psychological perspectives on CEO compensation: A review and synthesis’, Industrial and Corporate Change 19(3), 675–712. https://doi.org/10.1093/icc/dtp050
Obeidat, M.I. & Darkal, N., 2018, ‘Accounting versus economic based measures of performance and the share market value: The evidence of the industrial listed firms at Abu Dhabi stock Exchange’, WSEAS Transactions on Business and Economics 15(4), 363–374.
Pepper, A., 2021, ‘The behavioural economics of executive incentives’, NHRD Network Journal 14(2), 186–192. https://doi.org/10.1177/2631454120953038
Rehman, A., Ali, T., Hussain, S. & Waheed, A., 2021, ‘Executive remuneration, corporate governance and corporate performance: Evidence from China’, Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja 34(1), 3092–3118. https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2020.1867214
Scholtz, H.E., Jachi, M. & Nel, G.F., 2025, ‘Executive directors’ remuneration in South Africa: An examination of the effectiveness of corporate governance reforms’, Managerial Finance 52(2), 227–249. https://doi.org/10.1108/MF-08-2024-0603
Shaw, P.A., 2011, ‘CEO pay-performance sensitivity in South African financial services companies’, Master of Business Administration, University of Pretoria.
Stiegler, N. & Bouchard, J.-P., 2020, ‘South Africa: Challenges and successes of the COVID-19 lockdown’, Annales Médico-Psychologiques, Revue Psychiatrique 178(7), 695–698. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amp.2020.05.006
Sucheran, R., 2022, ‘The COVID-19 pandemic and guesthouses in South Africa: Economic impacts and recovery measures’, Development Southern Africa 39(1), 35–50. https://doi.org/10.1080/0376835X.2021.2003758
Tawiah, B.K. & Keefe, M.O., 2024, ‘Cash holdings and corporate investment: Evidence from COVID-19’, Review of Corporate Finance 4(3–4), 263–291. https://doi.org/10.1561/114.00000055
Tosi, H.L., Werner, S., Katz, J.P. & Gomez-Mejia, L.R., 2000, ‘How much does performance matter? A meta-analysis of CEO pay studies’, Journal of Management 26(2), 301–339. https://doi.org/10.1177/014920630002600207
Tusiime, I., 2024, COVID-19 crisis, firm outcomes and CEO compensation, PhD thesis, Discipline of Accounting and Finance, Newcastle Business School, College of Human and Social Futures, The University of Newcastle, Newcastle.
Ye, R., Chen, Y. & Kelly, K.A., 2023, ‘The effects of firm performance on CEO compensation and CEO pay ratio before and during COVID-19’, Research in Economics 77(4), 453–458. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rie.2023.07.002
Yusuf, F., Yousaf, A. & Saeed, A., 2018, ‘Rethinking agency theory in developing countries: A case study of Pakistan’, Accounting Forum 42(4), 281–292. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.accfor.2018.10.002
|
Hide
Show all
Email this article (Login required)
